Super Bowl 54: Second Half

#shakira

Everyone recovered from Shakira? Seriously, did y’all see where a man has discussed suing (FOX? Shakira? Her hips?), claiming Shakira’s clothing and movements put him in danger of “hellfire”?! Anywhoo, on to the second half breakdown nobody wants.

But seriously back to Shakira. She’s a year or two older than me, and she’s insanely beautiful and talented and HOLY SHIT 50 MILLION TWITTER FOLLOWERS – that’s impressive even if 45 million of them are bots, amirite? I can imagine a god-fearing person who’s never heard of the zaghrouta seeing Shakira and being shaken to their mental and physical and spiritual core. But we’re here to discuss football.

SF drive 59 plays, 60 yardsField Goal

Kickoff returned from the 2 for 14 yards. 

A short pass to Sanders is followed by a 15 yard gain to Sanders on a Slant from an Ace Wing Slot formation Split Zone PA against 1 Robber coverage. Then the Niners ran their Fake 1 back Counter, End Around with the lead blocker reversing field and Sanders gained 14 yards. On first from midfield, Coleman got four on a run to the left. Then out of I Right Slot with Z Jet motion, they faked Iso and threw a Wheel route to Juszczyk up the left side for 14 yards. Now at the KC 32, a TE Screen to Kittle gets 5 yards. A run by Mostert gets 0. On 3rd and 5, Kittle seems to be breaking open over the middle for a first down but Garoppolo throws underneath to Coleman, who had motioned out from the backfield.

And here is where Kyle Shanahan makes another mistake. Even after seeing the Chiefs go for two 4th and shorts, he sends Gould out to kick a 42 yd FG, which is good. But 3 points is worth almost nothing in a 10-10 game on the first drive of the second half.

SF 13 KC 10

KC drive 5 – 7 plays, 30 yards…Turnover (Interception)

Kickoff returned from 3 for 15 yards but PENALTY holding call is half the distance. 

On first, Mahomes scrambles around and finds Watkins downfield for 19 yards against the Niners 3 Sky after faking Split Zone. On first,  Kelce runs a great route but only gets 4 yards. Williams runs for 0 yards, bringing up a 3rd and 6. The Chiefs align in Gun Trey Left, motion Kelce across and run a rollout to the left, throwing a Flat route to the slot receiver Watkins for 9 yards. It looked like Mahomes threw a no-look pass here, as a defender was running towards him and leaping as he threw. On first, Williams gets 5 yards up the middle. Then Mahomes is sacked by Bosa (who rushed inside of LT Fisher) on what seems to be a Cat Fire Zone by the Niners; Mahomes fumbles but recovers, bringing up 3rd and 12. The Chiefs use a Gun Trey right formation with return motion by Kelce, running verticals. Now Mahomes makes a huge mistake (against maybe a Trips check, kinda looks like 3 Buzz Weak), thinking LB Warner will vacate a throwing window to allow a throw to the Slot WR on a deep Curl, but as Mahomes throws, Warner stops and the ball hits him right in the numbers.

SF drive 6 – 6 plays, 55 yards…Touchdown

On first from their own 45, the Niners use 21 personnel I Right viced and motion the FB short right; they run a Lead Split Zone PA with max pro and Garoppolo throws to Samuel the X on a Dig route for 16 yards, seemingly against Cover 4. Since you don’t see a lot of Cover 4 against that formation, maybe the Chiefs expected a shot play. The only other route was the Z running a Dino stem, so they were right. Samuel was open because after the playfake the underneath defenders focused on Kittle. 

On first, Mostert gets 2 on a run to the right. Now we get a huge mis-read by Garoppolo. From Gun Trey left with Fly motion (which a defender followed), the Niners fake 1 back power O to the left. The Chiefs had shown 1 Robber but they played Cover 0. The Chiefs blew a coverage, as the CB and and a LB chased the motion player. The MOF safety took the RB and Kittle broke wide open over the middle. Garoppolo threw deep incomplete to Sanders, who was tightly covered up the left seam. This is the play Kittle was frustrated about, bending over, knowing he had a TD if Garoppolo hit him in stride. On 3rd and 8, Garoppolo hits Bourne on a Post for 26 yards. The Chiefs seem to show 2 Man but played maybe 1 Double Kittle? On first down at the 11, the Niners run the same play they scored the first half TD on, a PA Zone and pass to Juszczyk who’s stopped just short of the goal line. On first and goal, Mostert punches it in. From Jumbo I Left, they motion Kittle across; at the snap, the LG pulls, the FB blocks to the left, and Mostert runs inside to the right. It’s a nice Goal Line split flow concept. With the PAT, the Niners are up 10.

SF 20 KC 10

KC drive 6 – 12 plays, 52 yards…Turnover (Interception)

Kickoff – Touchback

After an incompletion and a 5 yard run, Mahomes scrambles for the first down. After an incompletion to Watkins, Kelce catches a Curl for 9 yards against a Nickel Fire Zone. On 3rd and 1 (and the last play of the 3rd qtr), Kelce gets the first on a direct snap. He’s flanked by Williams to his right and Hill to his left. At the snap, Hill goes behind Kelce and to the right, as Kelce goes to the right after faking to Williams. On first, the LDE forces Mahomes to scramble left and throw incomplete. The ball hits the hands of a leaping Kwon Alexander. If Alexander comes down with it, the Niners have the ball in Chiefs territory up by 10. He may have even been able to return it. On 2nd and 10, Hill catches the ball and gets 14 yards. Then Mahomes checks down and gets 13 to Williams against 3 Sky coverage. On first, Mahomes is sacked by Buckner for a loss of 9. On 2nd and 19, Mahomes scrambles up the middle for 13 against a Cover 4, bringing up 3rd and 6. The Niners maybe play 1 Cross; Mahomes maybe tries to prevent Hill from taking a big hit; regardless, the ball is behind Hill and goes off his hands into the hands of Moore for an interception.

SF drive 7 – 5 plays, 17 yards…Punt

On first, Mostert gets 6 on a Power O to the right, putting the Niners at midfield. On 2nd, Kittle gets 12 yards on a Dig route on a PA Split Zone with a Fake End Around against a Will Fire Zone. On first, Mostert gets stuffed on Power O to the left, bringing up a key 2nd and 9 for the “run the bawl” crowd. Garoppolo clearly checks out of something (but was it a run, and why call a run on 2nd and 9?!) and runs a PA Split Zone from a 2×2 set. To the right, where 2 WRs are almost stacked, #1 runs a Dig while #2 runs a Bubble. The Chiefs showed 1 Robber but play Man Free with a Mike Dog and Green Dog. As Garoppolo faked the run and turned back to make his first read, LB Hitchens had shot the A gap. So instead of having time to go to his next read, Garoppolo threw to the Dig, high and incomplete. The second read, Bourne, was wide open in the flat and the nearest defender had fallen down. (Surely this was the second read as the only other player to release was the backside X who was running a Vert to clearout space for the Dig.

On 3rd and 9, Staley false starts, making it 3rd and 14. The Niners go 11 personnel shotgun with Kittle in the backfield. The Chiefs play a Wide 9 Double Mug front showing pressure. At the snap, the Chiefs back out of the pressure; they seem to play Tampa 2 and get quick pressure only rushing 4 against 7 man pro. Garoppolo is forced from the pocket. He gains 3 and is hit hard but in bounds, so no flag. So on 4th and 11, Wishnowsky punts 46 yards and it’s fair caught by Hardman.

The Chiefs are down 10 with 8:53 to go on their own 17 following consecutive INTs.

KC drive 7 – 11 plays, 83 yards…Touchdown

On first, Williams gets 3 on a run to the right. On 2nd and 7, the Chiefs run something similar to Wasp (seems to be against Cover 4 Poach) but Mahomes has to scramble for the first down. On first, a short pass to Hill gets 9, and they convert on a Williams run up the middle. A false start on Duvernay-Tardif makes it 1st and 15. A short incompletion to Hill is followed by a deep throw to Hill from Ace Drop Vice against a Cover 4. Hill seems to Trap the ball and the Niners challenge as we go to a commercial break. A break where surely Niners fans were celebrating.

Back from the break, it’s 3rd and 15. On NFL Films Mahomes asks Bieniemy “Do we have time to run ‘Wasp’?” The TE and RB assignments vary; Wasp means #1 runs a Deep In, #2 runs a Detroit (a Post Corner I’ve also seen referred to as a Wasp route) and #3 runs a Stutter Cross. The beauty of the route is Hill (possibly the fastest player in the NFL) runs upfield and at the MOF FS and waits until that player turns to run with him before breaking back towards the sidelines.

FLASHBACK 2018 season AFC Championship Game, Chiefs v Patriots. Needing a big play, the Chiefs dial up Wasp, run from their favored 1×3 formation but often with Kelce as #3 so the Chiefs have their best 3 threats on the same side. (And whereas Hill is often #3 of Trips, here he’s #2, with Watkins at #1.) With the Patriots showing 1 high Man, the Chiefs ran it as “Gun Trey Left Flex Run-Pass 3 Jet Wasp” with the RB to the side of Trips and used a run fake, throwing to Hill for 42 yards.

Against the Niners single high zone, the Chiefs ran it as “Gun Trey Right 3 Jet Chip Wasp Y-Funnel”. There was no play action. The TE chipped on the right side then ran a Funnel route; the RB chipped the left side, then ran downfield near the sticks.

After seeming to match the 1×3 with a Cover 4 variation known as Poach earlier in the game, this time the Niners called a 3 Buzz with a stunt. Even though the Flat defender (Tartt?) and Hook defender (Warner?) were in great position in front of the Dig, the RCB Moseley broke on it. While many have called this wrong, it’s probably his job to break on it at that depth. Hill has also vacated Moseley’s deep outside third. Ideally, Moseley would sink but the Chiefs don’t run Wasp much (probably because it’s hard to pass protect for that much time). They’d run something similar a couple of times in the Super Bowl and Hill had continued across the face of the deep Safety.

At the line of scrimmage, Bosa rushed to the inside of LT Fisher and Buckner looped around him to the outside. Mahomes dropped back unusually far, 14 yards and threw off-balance. The pass was phenomenal, traveling 57 air yards; Hill gained 44 yards.

On the Niners sideline (where I’d argue the coaches are always too emotional) defensive coordinator Saleh looks near tears, as he’s clearly seen mouthing “Oh my God” – whether he’s in awe of Mahomes and/or Hill, disappointed he called 3 Buzz instead of Poach, or maybe dumbfounded there was no holding call (I’m joking on that last bit, as uncalled holding has been an issue on many big Super Bowl plays, so let’s not waste our time whining, as it pales in comparison to what happened on the Helmet Catch. Let’s just be honest with each other; NFL officiating is often terrible, but most people want fewer flags thrown, and while I want more to be reviewable, on many plays it’s hard to tell, so let’s just move on because making pass interference “reviewable” has been a circus all year).

Two incompletions follow, the second overthrown to Williams after a double move on the LB. On 3rd and 10, Reid uses a favorite Patriots concept, Hoss Juke (#1 Hitch #2 Seam to each side with the #3 strong receiver running a Juke. The Niners, for maybe the first time all game, showed Man Free, putting Moore over Kelce in the weak slot – a huge mismatch. Mahomes looks the safety off and throws to Kelce; Moore never turns to look for the ball, and leaps into the air towards Kelce as the ball arrives, blatant pass interference which is called and puts the ball at the 1 for a first and Goal. Say what you will about the earlier 3 Buzz call, this Man Free call is hard to defend. Did Saleh panic? Did he plan this to surprise the Chiefs if they used Empty? I don’t mind Man Free, but I firmly believe (the sample size is too small to say for sure) it works way better if you show something else. They showed Man Free and Mahomes simply threw it to the matchup he liked.

Note: Hoss Juke was the play the Patriots ran three consecutive snaps against the Rams in the second half of Super Bowl 53; Gronk’s catch up the left seam gave them the first and goal that resulted in the only TD of the game.

Now Reid shows another great wrinkle, lining up in 23 personnel Strong Jumbo I Right and running a Spider 2 Y Banana variation in which the FB and HB exchange assignments. So Mahomes faked a handoff to the FB while the HB ran to the Flat. Kelce was the Wing TE, to the right, and he ran the Banana; he was wide open for the TD. The LCB (Safety Tartt) took the Flat and seemed furious nobody took Kelce.

With 6:13 to go, it’s a one score game!

SF 20       

KC 17

SF drive 8 3 plays 5 yards Punt

Kickoff returned from the 1 for 19 yards. 

On first, a pin and pull zone Sweep to Mostert to the left gains 5. On 2nd and 5, a creative play call as the Niners run essentially a Fake RPO. Lined up with two players split wide to the right, but not WRs: FB Juszczyk as #1 and Kittle as #2 with a WR motioning towards the ball; the WR loops around Garoppolo and sprints out towards Kittle and Juszczyk. The Chiefs have 8 in the box; they bring a zone pressure, the only underneath pass defender to the strong side is Suggs, rushing out to play the flat. Garoppolo fakes a screen; after briefly faking blocks, Kittle and Juszczyk run slants. Garoppolo makes the right read; Kittle is wide open. But DT Chris Jones knocks the ball down.

This brings up 3rd and 5. Another great call by Shanahan, as the Niners run Arches. #1 Bourne runs a Corner, #2 runs a Drag (Shanahan calls this Eliminator), and #3 Kittle runs an Arches route (which i’ve seen decribed as an Angle, a Slant, a Short Post, a Follow etc), bending outside then breaking inside, into the space cleared by the Drag. The Niners should be able to block it, with 6 man pro. The Chiefs overloaded the offensive left side, showing 1 Robber. But they played Man Free with a delayed Mike Dog and a Green Dog. Jones drove the LG backwards and the NT slanted left to occupy the C and RG as the Mike dogged. We’ll probably never hear the full story but maybe Garoppolo couldn’t see the middle of the field (*ahem* like Russel Wilson in Super Bowl 49 *ahem*) as all this unfolded. Maybe he thought he saw a different coverage. But what we know is he flung the ball towards the Corner route…and Bourne had run a Curl. On the All22 after the play you can see the TEs coach is mad, Shanahan is mad, and Bourne looks confused. Regardless, it made it 4th and 5 with 5:18 to go.

A 40 yard punt is fair caught by Hardman.

KC drive 8 – 7 plays, 65 yards…Touchdown

On first, Mahomes throws short left to Williams. On 2nd from Trips, #3 Kelce catches a Juke route for 9 yards. The Niners showed Cover 2 ish but then seemed to play Cover 4 Poach again (some sort of 5 over 3 Trips check). On first, a 3 yard pass to Hill.

On 2nd and 7 from the 48 with 3:44 on the clock, the Chiefs use Gun Doubles Right before motioning Kelce across to Trips. The Niners show 2 high but the SS is over the Slot who is creeping up. The Chiefs run a play Reid says they took from Kyle Shanahan, who ran it in 2010. The Niners surely hoped to get quick pressure as the CBs were pressed and they ran a Nickel Fire Zone 3. Watkins released inside of Sherman and then ran a Go as the deep Safety rotated away to play MOF (while the SS had come down). The Chiefs faked Outside Zone left and so Kelce chipped Bosa and the RB was there to pick up the Nickelback (also, the LDT fell down). The 5 man pressure was stopped by the 7 man protection and Watkins had blown past Sherman. Mahomes hits Watkins for a gain of 38.

On first, the Chiefs seem to run the same RPO as earlier to Bell, but Mahomes scrambles to the left. Then Mahomes is sacked by Tartt for a loss of one. On 3rd, the Chiefs align in the 1×3 but motion #3 Hill to sidecar right. The Niners show Man Free (following the motion) but then play a Cover 0. The Chiefs run Swap Boot, faking to Hill to the left as the two backs cross paths on their release, Williams going from left sidecar to the right Flat. Kelce’s route means he and Sherman are in the way of Williams’ defender. Mahomes throws it to Williams and Sherman arrives as Williams gets near the goal line.

Did he score? WHO KNOWS?! It was called a touchdown and certainly couldn’t be overturned. Frame by frame, the ball looked to touch the front of the plane as Williams’ foot touched out of bounds.  

With the PAT good, the Chiefs have taken the lead with 2:44 left, an eternity! Plus the Niners have three timeouts, plus the 2 minute warning!. We’ve got a game!

Note: Reid has said if they were ruled short of the end zone he’d have gone for it. We’ll never know!

SF 20 KC 24

SF drive 97 plays, 27 yards…Turnover (Downs)

Kickoff returned from GL for 15 yards.

Shanahan starts off the drive with a great call, a Draw play to Mostert out of Shotgun for 17 yards to the weak right side against a Dime 4-1 Cover 3 Buzz Strong. The RG blocked the Mike and the safety had to make the tackle. After a false start it was 1st and 15. Kittle catches a short Out for 8. On 2nd and 7, the Niners aligned in Gun Doubles and motioned Kittle across into a 3×1, throwing a Stick ish route to Bourne from the Slot for 16. This was against a Nickel 4-2 check v Trips, maybe Skate coverage? On first at the Chiefs 49, the Niners motioned into a 1×3 and ran another good play, kind a Double Stick Pivot concept to the right. Garoppolo seemed to make the right read and threw to Samuel, the inside Slot, but the pass was knocked down by Chris Jones. The coverage seemed to be 1 Double Kittle.

On 2nd and 10, the Niners go Gun Doubles and run All Slants, and it seems the Chiefs ran a 2 Man variation but with the Safeties each driving on #2 to their side? They Green Dog the RB.

On 3rd and 10, the Niners go back to the Shotgun formation with Kittle as one of the 2 backs and 3 WRs, all compressed.

Note: The author hates compressed formations against smart Defensive Coordinators because it makes it easier to disguise coverages. I’m not sure what Garoppolo thought he saw but there’s no way he knew the exact call. It was a one high call with two double coverages, a “Cone” double on the X (an underneath defender having short and outside, a deep defender high and inside and a “Cut” double on the #1 of Slot (an underneath defender having deep and outside. The MOF defender had the remaining receiver, Bourne, who ran a Dig route in front of him which was arguably open but NOT THE READ. The Chiefs rushed 5, possibly a peel call. The route concept is known as Mills by some, having been popular for Steve Spurrier’s Gators. The outside receiver runs a Post and the inside receiver runs a Dig. The backside receiver seemed to run a Deep Curl. Even though he was bracketed, Sanders ran through them to the Post and was open. Garoppolo missed by about 2 yards. It would have put the Niners in the lead with 1:33 to go. Again on NFL Films Shanahan seemed upset after a play. For all the mistakes he makes in big games, he also schemes up wide open receivers for what should be big plays. But I digress!

On fourth down, the game isn’t exactly in the balance, but it’s close. The Niners run another Shotgun 2 back condensed set, allowing another unpredictable call defensive call. From 2 high, the Chiefs seem to run a Peel call, with 6 rushers. The 3 WRs are clustered in the middle, each with a man defender on them, and with 2 Safeties near the sticks. Nobody is open, anyway. Back at the LOS, Jones rushes inside from the defensive left and knocks the Center off of Clark, who has looped inside from the defensive right. Clark gets the sack, which is a turnover on downs.

Situational Football: Game was not over, as SF had their timeouts

KC drive 9 – 2 plays, 42 yards…Touchdown

The Niners stop a Williams run up the middle for 4 and call timeout with 1:20 to go.

The Chiefs align in 22 personnel in a Big Wing Right I. The Niners align in a 4-3 Over Stack and play 3 Sky Strong. In a great call, the Chiefs run a lead play to the left. I’ve seen some people call it Iso, I’d call it Inside Zone Force Bounce, either way the FB Anthony Sherman saw the force defender (the Will LB) go outside the LT, he blocked him and the MOF FS took a bad angle and when he missed it was GOODNIGHT, IRENE as Williams raced up the sidelines for a 38 yard touchdown.

Note: Reid calls the play “95 Weak” but all that means in West Coast lingo is that it’s a run play and both backs are going to the same side. There’s a lot of 95 Weaks. No OL pulled, so call it what you want. Their were three double-teams on the LOS. The Niners bet on it being a strong side run, and they were out-leveraged as a result. Thems the breaks.

Now it was essentially over; after the PAT the Chiefs led 31 to 20 with 1:12 remaining.

The kickoff was a touchback.

After an incompletion towards Kittle, Garoppolo threw deep middle to Samuel and it was intercepted by Fuller. (The pass concept was similar to Shakes, the Air Raid 3 Verts play.  It was #1 Hitch, #2 Corner, #3 Post with a #1 Corner and #2 Flat backside. The coverage seemed to be Cover 4 Trips check.)

So, now it was Victory Formation time. 3 kneeldowns and a meaningless deep pass out of bounds as the clock expired.

KC drive 10 Victory Formation

3 kneeldowns and a meaningless deep pass out of bounds as time expires and it’s over. I’m happy for Andy Reid and the Honey Badger, I’m glad I’ll never have to see any “Mahomes is the new Marino thinkpieces, we got some great Xs and Os AND some great situational football JUST LIKE ALL OF THE PAST FIVE SUPER BOWLS, STOP COMPLAINING, PEOPLE, WE ARE LIVING IN THE GOOD TIMES [continues screaming…]

Note: I must mention Steve Spagnuolo, who burst on the scene by using great calls to defeat the 18-0 Patriots in Super Bowl 42 and has been much derided since and just called another good game against a top offense. Even the plays where the Niners had someone open, it seemed to mostly be busted coverages, not bad calls. Like the superhuman effort by Justin Tuck in Super Bowl 42 (which should have resulted in a Super Bowl MVP award for Tuck), Spagnuolo got a superhuman effort by Chris Jones in Super Bowl 54 (which should have resulted in a Super Bowl MVP award for Jones).

 

Super Bowl 54: First Half

I’m gonna try to put my notes from the Super Bowl and add some clips if I have time.

KC drive 13 plays, 7 yards…Punt

Kickoff returned by Hardman from middle of end zone to the 26

On first down, a great play design where they fake Inside Zone to the left but then run an option to the right; Mahomes pitches to Williams for 7 yards. Second and 3, RB screen left to Williams, tipped by Bosa, incomplete. Third and 3, incomplete checkdown to Williams to the right. This play was from the 1×3 formation the Chiefs love (usually 11 personnel with Kelce alone in a close split to the Boundary with 3 WRs to the Field and one RB with Mahomes in the shotgun), they run #1 Slant #2 Flat #3 Drag with a Curl and Swing backside. On NFL Films, Mahomes said he could have thrown the Drag route but left it too early. The 49ers showed 1 Robber but played Man Free.

On 4th and 3, the Chiefs punted for 49 yards; James muffs it but recovers.

SF drive 110 plays, 62 yards…Field Goal

On first down, Coleman loses a yard. Second and 11, the Niners motion the FB across to the wing from a Weak I Left formation and fake Outside Zone to the right and throw to Kittle for an 11 yard gain on a Flood concept. Kittle had aligned at #1 and ran a little slant pivot type route. On first and ten, from a Shotgun with two backs and a WR near each side, Kittle motioned from right wing to left wing; they faked Power O left and ran an end around to Samuel who got 32 yards up the right side before being run out of bounds by Mathieu at the Chiefs 40. Clark had done a great job containing but there was room inside of him. On first and ten, Coleman got 7 yards. But then on 2nd and 3, the Niners follow Jet action with a handoff on Weak I Counter OF for only 1 yard. Third and 2, the Niners ran some sort of trick play where Samuel got the ball and seemed to want to throw, maybe to Garoppolo, who had released to the left side. The defense was in a 3 Buzz zone and didn’t bite, so to his credit Samuel didn’t panic and throw an interception; he turned upfield and picked up the first down, running for 7 yards. On first and ten, now on the edge of the red zone, the Niners threw a screen to Mostert but only got 2 yards. Second and 8, a short pass to Samuel lost 2 yards. After a defensive offsides penalty on third and 10, the Niners threw incomplete to Kittle as part of a Trips set, under pressure from a 5 man rush where #54 dogged. On fourth and 5, the Niners settled for a 37 yard FG by Gould.

The Niners take a 3-0 lead.

KC drive 2 – 15 plays, 75 yards…Touchdown

Kickoff – Touchback

On first down, the Chiefs use 12 personnel in an Ace Wing Left Slot formation with Kelce motioning across to throw a PA pass to Hill on a Double Curl concept on the right side gets 9 yards. 2nd and 1, Williams gets 2 yards to the left. On first, a short pass to hill gets 8, a penalty is declined after a 2nd down incompletion, and Williams converts getting 5 over the left side. On first from midfield, the Chiefs run an RPO from Gun Ace Wing Right Slot, motioning Kelce across and getting 9 as Kelce runs a quick Seam route. On first, from Doubles, they run a Fake Jet Sweep with Williams getting 14 yards to the right on a Split Zone run. On first, Hill gets 3 on a short pass, then from the 1×3 set Kelce converts on a Dig of a weakside Levels concept. This seems to be against a Slot Fire Zone which the Niners ran later. On first from the 14, the Chiefs line up in the 1×3 and run 999. The Niners seem to run a 2 high Poach coverage, which handles the verts well, and Mahomes throws incomplete. On 3rd and 11, the Chiefs run the 1×3, Mahomes scrambles to the right. For a moment it looks like he’ll score but he’s hit hard near the sticks by Ward and the ball flies backwards and out of bounds. Mahomes jumps up, yelling “That’s a good-ass hit!” as Ward stays down. Mahomes had gained the first but lost it on the fumble; Ward’s injury leads to a big swing. During the long TV timeout with a 4th and 1 looming, the Chiefs offense had left the field, but on the sidelines Mahomes asked to go for it, leading to Reid changing his mind and sending the offense back out. A perfect chance to run something special, and Reid does, aligning in an unbalanced line with a diamond backfield which then, in unison, spins to the right and realigns in an unbalanced Single Wing formation with Mahomes as the Blocking Back aka Quarter Back. The Chiefs snap the ball to Williams who runs a Buck Dive with a Lateral fake (to Mahomes with Watkins as the pitch man); 3 defenders go to the right with Mahomes and the faking Watkins; Williams nearly scores, being ruled just short of the end zone. A first and goal run fails, but then on 2nd and goal from the 1, the Chiefs shift the FB from a Jumbo I Left to the right wing and run a nifty Counter Speed Option to the right. It’s Mahomes and Williams versus Tartt; Mahomes keeps and dives into the end zone.

Note: The Single Wing play, which they called “Shift to Rose Bowl Right Parade,” was taken from legendary Michigan coach Fritz Crisler in the 1948 Rose Bowl but with the spinning shift added and the OL adding a Landry shift in which they slightly adjusted their splits for better blocking angles. 

KC takes the lead, 7 – 3

SF drive 2 – 3 plays, 16 yards…Turnover (Interception)

Kickoff – Touchback

On first, from the Strong I with Jet action, the Niners fake Power O and use Max Pro to throw a deep Curl to Sanders on the right side for 18 yards against a 3 Sky coverage. On 2nd and 12, the Niners motion Kittle into Trips, the Chiefs play 1 Robber and get pressure and Garoppolo seems to try and throw it away in the direction of the backside X Corner route but it’s intercepted downfield by Breeland.

KC drive 3 – 9 plays, 43 yards…Field Goal

On first, great design including double motion and then play action leads to a 28 yard gain by Watkins. The Chiefs start in Doubles but motion Kelce across from right to left into a Bunch (a defender traveled with this), then motion #1 of the Bunch, Watkins, across to the right Wing (no defender traveled with this). The Niners show Cover 3. The Chiefs fake Split Zone left. Both outside WRs release vertically, running a Post from the left and a Deep Out from the right, and taking the CBs with them. After the run fake, the RB stays in the left Flat, holding the Flat defender, as Watkins runs a Drag and then turns Vertical up the left side as the Hook defender realizes what’s happening too late. Mahomes hits Watkins in the huge hole.

A penalty on each team and it’s again first down at the Niners 28. A 2 yard pass to Hardman short left, a 3 yard run by Williams up the middle, and a 4 yard pass to Watkins in the middle make it 4th and 1. Again Reid correctly chooses to go for it! He runs another great play, shifting into Gun Bunch Left with Kelce to the right and Williams left sidecar. Due to the shift, the Niners have an edge defender to each side but only one off the ball LB, aligned in front of Williams. The Chiefs run a Speed Option to their right, Mahomes options off the edge defender and Williams gets the first down.

A deep pass incomplete to Williams, an RPO give to Williams to the right side gets 3, and an incomplete HB option [or Angle] route to Thompson in which the FS breaks up the pass make it 4th and 7 and the Chiefs kick the FG.

KC goes up 10 – 3.

SF drive 37 plays, 80 yards…Touchdown

Kickoff returned from the 7 for 13 yards.

A first down run by Mostert gets one yard. On 2nd and 9, Jet motion is followed with a run play as Mostert gets the ball on a Toss Crack left and gets 9 and a first down. A Shotgun formation Fly Tap Pass to Samuel gets 16 yards. Mostert gets 11 on a weakside Outside Zone to the right from Ace Wing Left. Now across midfield, Coleman gains 17 on a great Split Outside Zone from the I formation with FB misdirection (Juszczyk runs to the right at the snap). Now near the red zone at the Chiefs 26, the Niners use a compressed formation to run a RPO with Outside Zone action left and Double Slants concept, throwing the inside Slant to Samuel for 11 yards against Man Free coverage.

With the ball at the 15, the Niners motion Juszczyk from offset Strong I Left with a Slot almost-Stack to the right wing (essentially #3 of a Bunch). The Niners fake Outside Zone to the left; Garoppolo boots right; Juszczyk after blocking pivots and is wide open. He breaks Sorensen’s tackle and rumbles into the end zone. The Chiefs had showed 1 high but played Cover 0.

We are now tied at 10.

SF 10 KC 10

KC drive 4 – 7 plays, 30 yards…Punt

Kickoff returned from 5 for 14 yards.

On first from their own 19, the Chiefs use the 1×3 formation but Mahomes checks it down to Williams, who barely gets a first. It’s similar to the later “Wasp” play but #2 runs a Drag. The Niners kinda showed a 3 Sky but seemed to play a version of Cover 4 over Trips. On first down, a great RPO that they ran again later: from Ace Drop condensed, Kelce goes across to the left as the ball is snapped in Split Zone action. The route combo is #1 WR Post, #2 TE Wheel, #3 TE Flat. The defense has the Post covered but the underneath players are focused on #3 Kelce, so Mahomes has an easy completion to #2 the TE Bell for 9 yards. On 2nd, Williams converts with a 4 yard run. On first, from Ace Drop, the Chiefs run both WRs on deep Curls and throw to Hill against a Snake Fire Zone 3. On first, Williams gets 2. On second, Hardman loses 6 on a Fake Jet Sweep, End Around. On 3rd and 14, a checkdown to Williams gets one yard.

As the play ends, there’s about 1:50 on the clock and the Niners have 3 timeouts. The Niners correctly let the clock run, as you don’t wanna call the timeout and then be pinned at your own 1 while the Chiefs have 3 timeouts. As Bill Belichick has said (in an NFL Films clip) most of the time “you’re better off with less time and more timeouts than more time and fewer timeouts.” The Chiefs barely miss downing the ball at the one; it bounces into the end zone for a touchback with :58 left. THIS is where the Niners made mistakes, but running two uncreative run plays. You’ve gotta have something special there. You cannot just waste a possession in the Super Bowl when there’s :58 and you have 3 timeouts.

SF drive 4 – 4 plays, 14 yards…End of Half

Here’s how it looks in the play by play:

1  – 10 20- run Mostert left tackle 3 (Fuller)

2 – 7 23- run Mostert left guard 2 (Kpassagnon, Niemann)

CHIEFS TIMEOUT #1

Now it’s 3rd and 7 and the Chiefs want the ball. The Niners run a real play, using a Shotgun with a Bunch. The Chiefs run a Cat Fire Zone 3 and Garoppolo throws to Wilson on an Angle route for 20 yards.

But now there are only 14 seconds left. The Niners use a 1×3 formation of their own and throw a Go route to Kittle who is singled up with Sorensen. The Chiefs rushed 3 and seemed to play man across the board with 1 MOF defender and two robbers. Kittle catches the ball for a 42 yard gain but Kittle is flagged for offensive pass interference for pushing off. I understand the argument from either side, but the fact is Kittle created space by fully extending his arm, and sometimes that get’s called. He had gotten open by pushing off, but Garoppolo had thrown such a good pass Kittle probably didn’t need the extra space. Regardless, it was called and certainly not overturned on review [hahahaahahahaha].

So, with only 6 seconds left on their own 35, the Niners kneel to assorted boos from the crowd.

HALFTIME with everyone tied at 10 and most people unhappy!

I’ll post the second half tomorrow.

SUPER BOWL LIV PREVIEW

Prediction: The team that scores the most points will win, eh?

But seriously, let’s talk Xs and Os for a minute.

The Niners offense is a great mix of run and pass. Many say it’s “an outside zone offense” but that’s not what it is. They run pretty much every run game concept, and even if you just watch the playoffs you’ll see Power O, Counter Trey, Traps, Sweeps, Iso – everything. As for zone, they run all variations of Zone, which many people say is “inside or outside” but encompasses all sorts of concepts (split flow, lead or no lead, handoff and tosses). One of their best plays is a zone misdirection run in which the FB leads the HB to the backside. I especially like when they run their 21 personnel stuff but from shotgun instead of under center.

The pass game is often built off zone action. While they haven’t thrown much to FB Kyle Juszczyk in the playoffs, he could be a tough matchup for the Chiefs, as could the Niners HBs. Presumably the Chiefs will play base versus the Niners 21 and 22 personnel. But oh man, it’s hard to bet against Chiefs DC Steve Spagnuolo with an extra week to prepare. It’s been a long time since he shut down the 2007 Patriots in Super Bowl 42, but he did it by going against the tendencies they’d prepared for. And I love watching the Honey Badger, he should be all over the field Sunday. He’s the rare defender who will blitz, play the slot, play box safety, play deep safety. Which safety is on Kittle could go a long way to deciding the game, because if that guy needs help, Jimmy G should be able to throw to the backs. I’m just talking in circles, huh?!

The Chiefs offense has a QB everyone agrees is already an all-time great, and it’s hard to argue. It felt like the Chiefs win was inevitable against the Texans even when the Texans went up 24-0, because the only thing the Chiefs had done wrong at that point was drop passes. The Niners pass rush has been really good, but that doesn’t mean Mahomes won’t be able to move around and throw incredible passes into small windows, often from unique arm angles. Pat Mahomes is a great example of why I no longer gamble on sports.

Sure, the Niners Robert Saleh defense play the Carroll-era Seahawks “Cover 3 zone” but like the Seahawks there’s plenty of Cover 3 variations, plus some Cover 2 and Cover 4). It’s not your grandaddy’s “country cover 3”! Most of the zone stuff is pattern match zone (which is very close to Man coverage) and they play Man on lots of 3rd downs. Which means they’ve gotta have a plan to match the Chiefs’ speed. Probably often out of the Gun Dakota formation (a 3×1 formation with 3 WRs to the wide side, TE Kelce to the short side) which the Chiefs love to run all sorts of vertical concepts and crossing concepts out of.

Cover 3 note: The Chargers play some of the same stuff as the Niners, and they had SOME success taking away what Mahomes wanted to do. But maybe that helps Reid prepare?! The Chiefs of course won both games but the matchup zone seemed to take away some of what Mahomes likes, and most of the Chiefs TDs came from the run game (which notably in the red zone was 2-back and often 2 TE). Maybe Reid will come into this game with some run wrinkles. I wouldn’t be surprised if the Chiefs have trouble blocking the Niners front four. It’s not just Nick Bosa. If the Chiefs have to use extra pass blockers, I could see the Niners having a lot of success.

In the end, it’s two good play-callers, each with extra time to prepare, so it could be a lot like Super Bowl 52 (or Chiefs v Rams last year, or Niners v Saints this year) – a shootout. I’ll be with the dogs, rooting for a defensive masterpiece like Super Bowl 53, the most fascinating game in years from an Xs and Os standpoint.

All I really want is a game that DOESN’T come down to bad situational football decision-making. But here we have Andy Reid, who pissed away a chance to win Super Bowl 39 by not telling his QB Donovan McNabb to hurry up, and Kyle Shanahan, who pissed away a chance to win Super Bowl 51 by not telling his QB Matt Ryan to slow down. Sure, in a way, “all football is situational football” and that’s the beauty of it, but lot of the decisions are fairly simple, you can literally use your time to prepare writing it down and laminating it.

Side note: It was alarming to see Andy Reid give his time to Peter King, just to get another “OMG I was up at 3 am” article, like the article with McVay last year. McVay, who looked like he’d never seen Quarters coverage. Hopefully Reid’s not just preparing for Cover 3. One easy comparison would be Super Bowl 48, in which everyone talked about the Seahawks Cover 3 but then Kam Chancellor nearly killed Demaryius Thomas on a crosser against Cover 1 Robber.

Just be glad we have two good teams (both have been good all year, and both are healthy) and we’re not dealing with the NFL lying about air pressure like we were at this point 5 years ago. (NEVER FORGET!)

Most Super Bowls come down to 3 things: turnovers and red zone scoring, often with a crucial catch or drop or dropped INT in the closing moments. This will probably be another one of those. But if I put that at the top, you’d never have read this far!

 

A RANT ABOUT FUZZY MATH

I hate the non-schematic part of football, but here we are in the offseason, and the amount of lies about Le’Veon Bell is on my mind. I’m high as a kite, but even now, with the room spinning, I know “he lost money he’ll never make back” is BULLSHIT and that Bell wanted out of Pittsburgh (which he got) and wanted to choose his team (which he got) and wanted to avoid a 400 carry season for a team that knew he’d be leaving (which he got) and that above all, $25 million (which he got) fully guaranteed will ALWAYS be more than what the Steelers offered. All reliable reports say they offered either $10 mil or $20 mil, and the tag was $14.54 mil. Go with any of those numbers, they’re less than $25 mil. Yet, NFL “experts” are littering the internet and podcast airwaves with insults. Are they stupid or just carrying water for the NFL (who desperately wants fans to think a player can’t win by holding out)? If Todd Gurley had a big Super Bowl, there’d probably be more bidders for Bell, but Gurley laid an egg – and Bell knew this was a risk, and clearly decided it was worth it. Most owners won’t pay for a RB anyway. But if you watch Bell play aligned out wide, you’d know he’s far more than a “RB” (we don’t have time to get into how outdated many position names are, but George Allen referred to this problem IN THE EFFING 1970s)!

BUT GUESS WHAT?! In terms of fully guaranteed money, Bell DID get more than Gurley. Gurley got $21 mil, DAVID JOHNSON got $24 mil (which nobody seems to mention), and Bell got $25 mil. SARCASM ALERT OH WHAT A FOOL BELL HAS BEEN.

The fully guaranteed number is ALL that matters. The other contract numbers are often full of bullshit, with all sorts of ways for teams to get out of paying. Teams weasel out of paying all the time.

Due to all the lies, the next player in Bell’s shoes probably won’t sit out. It doesn’t matter to anyone other than the player, his agent, and sycophant “fans” who rant about how they’d play for free. But then again, the franchise tag has been used less recently, as teams realize the player is pissed all offseason and the team should either trade them before that year or let them go and get the compensatory (along with saving cap and cash).

If Bell played for any team other than the Steelers, you could argue he should have taken the best 2 year guarantee he could have gotten, but since we know the Steelers only guarantee the first year, this is a stupid/dishonest thing to pretend he could have done as the Steelers held his rights.

So, Bell was ballsy (which is always more interesting), stayed healthy, got paid, got to leave the dumpster fire that is the current Tomlin-era Steelers organization (which drove BOTH Bruce Arians and Dick LeBeau out of town and gave away Antonio Brown because he bleached his mustache yet still defends their QB who’s accused of multiple rapes), gets to live [essentially] in New York City, the greatest city in the world. WHAT A LOSER (more sarcasm).

Then again, it’s the Jets, they were by all accounts negotiating against themselves and will find a way to lose somehow, as they’ve done since 1969. What a sad franchise. You gotta wonder why George RR Martin is a fan. Nobody who understands the Xs and Os of football supports the Jets. I would say “he should spend time learning the game” but no, for the love of god he should spend his time writing the book he shoulda finished years ago but may not live to complete.

Meanwhile, look at those GRRM-hated Patriots, sitting out the big ticket free agents part of free agency madness yet again, with teams (including the Lions who have no excuse since their GM Quinn and their HC Patricia came from New England) throwing too much money at many players. The Jaguars gave NICK FOLES $22 mil. He won the Super Bowl, I get it. BUT WHEN ON A REASONABLE CONTRACT. You could argue it’s worth anything to avoid more Bortles, but I’d argue overpaying a QB is never worth it. Surely, I’ll be right for the 25th consecutive year. And nobody will listen, and I’ll rant about free agency mistakes and lies all over again. Westward the wagons! Across the sands of time!

A DEFENSE (GET IT?) OF SUPER BOWL 53

Somehow, the “fans” who don’t understand the game and the writers and the podcasters all agree Super Bowl 53 was boring. It was one of the most exciting I’ve seen, and I’m old. It was a low scoring game, which meant a single play could have been huge, which is EXCITING – dare I say, RIVETING. For an example of a recent boring Super Bowl, see Super Bowl 48. It wasn’t competitive. Super Bowl 53 was incredibly competitive, and you could argue it featured not just two of the greatest defensive game plans in Super Bowl history, but two of the greatest executed defensive game plans in Super Bowl history. 

The only boring part of Super Bowl 53 was Sean McVay showing an incredibly limited playbook. It seemed until this game he had a great strategy, showing defenses the “same things” and running seemingly infinite variations off those concepts. But apparently 90% of McVay’s playbook is compressed formations with Jet/Fly action and/or zone run action with boot action and when faced with a defense aligned to stop those things, McVay either doesn’t think he should run anything else, or worse, doesn’t know anything else to run. Which is especially bizarre because NFL Films captured McVay before the game complimenting Bill Belichick on his unique game plans. Yet somehow, McVay didn’t think Belichick would have a unique game plan in the Super Bowl?!

The most obvious thing to learn from the previous year’s Super Bowl 52 was the value of running something your opponent hasn’t seen. A unique motion (the RB motioning across the ball and to a side with Trips) led to the game-winning TD for the Eagles by getting the Patriots defense (by having to match the unpredictable motion) from a Cover 1 into a Cover 0 with one on one on the TE Ertz. I reckon McVay was too busy bragging about waking up at 4 am to ever get around to watching Super Bowl 52. To quote Cersei Lannister, “Shame! Shame!”.

It seems everyone is calling the Patriots defense a 6-1 while I’d call it a 4-3 with the OLBs (SS Chung as the SLB and LB Van Noy as the WLB, later LB Hightower as the SLB and LB Van Noy as the WLB after Chung’s injury) on the line. It was often a 6 man surface, with a DT, DE, LB/SS to each side of the ball. They had the 6 players on the line control the run game and boot action, with the off-the-line MLB (Hightower, later Roberts after Chung’s injury) able to play less aggressively, so he was in great position to play the underneath middle.

Note: I’ve heard at least one person call it a “Landry 4-3”) so I’m not the only old man raging that it was a 4-3 but that’s beside the point.

The Patriots ran Hoss Juke 3 consecutive plays, which wasn’t earth-shattering as they proved years ago they’ll run it on consecutive plays, but they did it from 22 personnel against a Base defense, which helped the Patriots have pass game mismatches. They disguised it a bit with motion but on all 3 snaps, at the snap, to the Field, the Patriots aligned FB Develin at #1, TE Allen at #2, WR Edelman at #3 and to the Boundary, the Patriots aligned HB Burkhead at #1, TE Gronk at #2. The first play was the Juke to Edelman, the second play was the Hitch to Burkhead, the third play was the Seam to Gronk. This led to the ONLY red zone snap of the entire game, a TD run by Michel on what seemed to be the Patriots beloved Slant 34/35 Ace with the FB leading Michel to the left side from a Jumbo formation.

Note: People keep calling it “Hoss Y Juke” but it’s “Hoss Y Juke” when a TE runs the Juke, and this was a WR, Edelman. The terminology changes, so I just call it Hoss Juke. There’s a YouTube video of Bill O’Brien explaining it. It seems other teams would know about it, but they often seem surprised, even though it’s the Patriots favorite Empty concept.

Both defenses did a great job of showing one coverage and often playing something different. The Patriots often used a Cover 4 shell, sometimes having one safety closer to the LOS showing a possible Cover 3, then playing anything from Cover 4, Cover 3, or man (usually rushing 5 and playing Cover 1). The Rams used a one high Cover 1 look and played some man (sometimes with a double on Gronk or Edelman) and sometimes played zone. The Patriots’ first pass was intercepted, as it looked like Cover 1 Robber (man) but was actually Cover 3 Buzz zone.

The Patriots know the value of showing the opponent something new, and they’d played the most man coverage in the league, often out of a 1 high look. the 2 high look with CBs way off was new, and it looked even stranger because CB Jonathan Jones played one of the “Safety” spots, which helped the Patriots match up better when they decided to play man, as the Rams usually had 3 WRs on the field.

The Patriots rush strategy was mostly based on pass rush games aimed at Rams RG. But they had success across the board, against the highest paid offensive line in the NFL (insert laughter). They hit Goff often, which further through him off, although some of the biggest hits were his fault for holding the ball too long (one sack by Van Noy and a play near the sidelines). The Patriots rushed 4 or 5 on most plays. When they rushed 5, the Rams had lots of trouble with the Patriots games. One one sack, Hightower beat the RG through the A gap and then Van Noy looped into the same gap, while Clayborn got past LT Whitworth on the other side. The Patriots did a great job of getting one on one blocking by their alignment. Even in Sub, they’d sometimes run a 3-2 personnel 4-2 front with Devin McCourty as an off the line LB, including on the Cover 0 which led to the INT.

In McVay’s defense, there should have been two TDs to Cooks which both hit Cooks in the hands, and the first would have made the game 7-3 and the second would have tied it at 10 (or made it 14-10 if the first was completed). Maybe McVay would have been praised for being true to himself or some other bullshit, but with two weeks to prepare, I expected all sorts of spread concepts, empty sets, maybe some unique backfields. At times during the year McVay used a few interesting game-planned wrinkles (especially against the Vikings and Chiefs, both Rams wins), but for the SUPER BOWL he had nothing the Patriots didn’t expect.

Jared Goff will probably never live this game down. The sack by Kyle Van Noy on 3rd and 2 where Goff seemed to have no idea he had held the ball too long or that Van Noy was running full speed at him was the worst play other than the interception. But the interception was a product of McVay’s sight adjustment being a Fade instead of a Slant or Hitch which would have been an easy completion as Gilmore was way off, only playing the Fade. BUT Jared Goff made a few great throws, and was always (until the last possession) one play from a tie or lead, so he could have been much worse.

The Patriots seemed to understand that Goff was confused and that McVay wouldn’t run anything new, so after the early INT they decided to not be stupid on offense. That’s great! Their run game was fascinating, with Power O, Counter Trey, Wham, Iso, Duo, Draw, Zone and more all run as Dante Scarnecchia proved again he’s the greatest offensive line coach in the NFL. Their pass protection was great, much of it dependent on Brady getting rid of the ball so as not to risk Donald and Suh blowing up the game. People criticizing the Patriots offense are not paying attention to the context of what the Patriots were doing. Brady held the ball too long one time and it was a sack fumble that the Patriots were fortunate to recover. Joe Thuney handled Aaron Donald one on one for much of the game.

Later, I’ll post my insanely long play by play analysis of the game (it’s currently 20 pages), but since nobody will read it, I’ll try to insert some images to make it even longer.

Clowns in the Booth notes:

It was CBS, so we were saddled with Jim “Hello Nasty” Nantz and Tony Romo. Nantz was awful as always, demonstrating why we don’t need a play-by-play announcer in the era of large high-definition TVs. Romo didn’t seem to try and guess as many plays, which was nice because he’s often wrong, but he did lots of yelling and while he recognized Hoss Juke, he didn’t seem to know the name of it, which is strange, as football nuts have been talking about it for a decade. Romo didn’t seem to understand the Patriots defense, which they played on almost half the snaps. Romo seemed to think the first would-be TD to Cooks was Goff just seeing everything too late, when it was actually a great defensive call which took advantage of two Rams tendencies: 1) to use hard play action with Goff turning his back to the defense and 2) to use max protection which limited the number of routes. The Patriots showed Cover 3, and that’s what Goff expected to see when he turned around and he then, seeing it WASN’T Cover 3, had to take the time to realize it was a Cover 4. Jason McCourty was able to get over to make the play partly because the throw was late (which the Patriots anticipated would happen due to them confusing Goff with the pre-snap look) AND because there were only 3 routes on that play (there was 7 man protection) with no pass route on McCourty’s outside fourth of the field (which NFL Films showed the Patriots anticipated, after seeing the play earlier, they made a coverage change for the next time, assigning McCourty to get over to play the Post route from the opposite side, atypical for Quarters coverage). Romo didn’t seem to realize Cooks had dropped the second would-be TD before Harmon got over there to “break it up”. The worst thing Romo did was refer to McVay as “brilliant” when McVay started going slower, not realizing that this helped the Patriots defense just as much as it helped the Rams offense. The Patriots were changing the call when Goff would change the play, so it didn’t matter how fast or slow he went, he was gonna be confused either way, especially with the compressed formations (which allowed the defense to disguise more). At least if going fast and spreading out and running quick screens or draw plays the Rams could have forced the Patriots out of their base 6-1 Quarters alignment. I’ll never understand why Romo thought McVay’s decision was “brilliant” especially when the Rams were doing so poorly, punting on almost every possession (their first 8!). If that’s “brilliant”, what’s stupid? 

Just in case you, dear reader, think I’m hating on Sean McVay, I wanna emphasize that he’s only 33 years old and is already one of the best coaches in the NFL, and that as proven by his having one of the 32 hardest to get jobs in the world AND his girlfriend’s spectacular instagram account, he’s already won at all that matters in life. He’s got 30-40 years of being a head coach in front of him if he wants, and I bet next time he’ll expect the other head coach to have game-planned. Just like in Super Bowl 49, NFL Films captured Belichick explaining that the opponent wasn’t doing anything new, all the Patriots had to do to win was not make mistakes.

Seven DBs, OH MY!

[Jumps onto soapbox]

Another great example of the bad analysis rampant around the NFL are all the articles in the past few days about the Chargers using seven defensive backs against the Ravens. It’s nothing new. Sure, if you wanna go by personnel stats, nobody used 7 DBs more than 20% of a game and the Chargers did it 58 of 59 snaps, but that’s only if you ignore that many of today’s players are hybrid SS/LB types. If a defense has a converted SS at LB and they play a Dime, that’s essentially “7 DBs”, but people just call it a Dime. Many defenses have done that, with some recent examples being the Rams with Mark Barron and the Cardinals with Deone Bucannon. If there’s 2 CBs, 2 safeties, and Barron or Bucannon at LB, people called it Base, and nobody died.

In 2010 Rex Ryan used 7 DBs to upset the Patriots in the playoffs, as the Patriots didn’t have enough of a run game to make him pay. The Chargers used a variation of this, just putting safeties at LB (basically running a 4-2 with safeties at LB and 5 other defensive backs doing the same things they’d do in a nickel defense) to get more speed on the field to stop the run game. It wasn’t a new thing. It was a typical nickel defense, with faster players at the second level. You’re welcome to be pedantic and call them “linebackers” or “defensive backs” but they’re just football players. Using a faster player who is technically in a different position grouping is nothing new. Jimmy Johnson was putting safeties at LB and LBs at DE decades ago, and he was converting them to that position. Bill Belichick used safety Rodney Harrison as a LB against the Colts. (Belichick also used LB Mike Vrabel over the Center some (where a 0 Tech Nose Tackle would align), and CB Kyle Arrington at Defensive End some, and WRs Troy Brown and Julian Edelman at CB – whatever gets the job done).

It would be news if the Chargers used 7 CORNERBACKS at the same time, but even that wouldn’t be truly revolutionary, as many players (Devin McCourty probably the best example) are capable of being outside CB, slot CB, hole player, deep safety by alignment, regardless of how they’re listed on the depth chart. Troy Polamalu used to play all over the field and was often just following his instincts (Dick LeBeau has been quoted as saying he believes one player on the field should be free to follow his instincts on the play, without a strict assignment).

So congrats to the Chargers DC Gus Bradley, who wasn’t stubborn, but thumbs down to all these writers pretending 7 DBs are some earth-shaking revolution. Just as the offensive explosion was overrated a month or two ago, with clowns saying the NFL was changing forever, the postseason often sees defensive innovations being overblown. Even a loose grasp of NFL history should show how it’s all been done, just the names are different. But most NFL writers seem to have no grasp at all of NFL history.

It was the first playoff game against Lamar Jackson, who had run at historic levels, so one could assume any DC with 7 healthy DBs who could be trusted to tackle would run a similar grouping out there. Some teams have good tackling DBs, and the Chargers, who run a system similar to Pete Carroll’s, have them. Speaking of Pete Carroll, he has been using 3-1-7 “Bandit” personnel for decades (the earliest I’ve seen it referenced for him was in the 90s with the Patriots). Around the same time Dick LeBeau called his 7 DB package “Penny”.

BECAUSE IT’S NOT NEW TO PUT EXTRA DBs ON THE FIELD.

[Steps down off soapbox, turns on Game Pass, and sees some clown calling an Empty formation with 2 RBs and a TE “5 Wide Receivers”; gives up whining about position names]

P.S. Legend tells of a game in the 80s in which a team used 8 DBs against the Marino-era Dolphins, but I haven’t found film of it yet…now THERE’S a story (it’s still not a story)!

A Brief History of the Shotgun Formation

Nowadays more than 50% of NFL snaps are from the Shotgun. But let’s hop in the way-back machine and see what it was like back in the old days…

Many early formations used a snap to a player 5-7 yards behind the center. Below from left to right: Single Wing, Double Wing, Rockne Box, Short Punt, SMU Y formation

formation_shotgun_ish

Sammy Baugh essentially ran the shotgun out of the double wing in the 1930s at TCU.

1939 Don Faurot at Missouri put QB Paul Christman further back in a modified short punt. 

1942 Packers Single Wing QB threw a TD pass that the NFL put in the record books as “shortest forward pass” because the ball had been spotted 4 inches away from the goal line. 

The Dutch Meyer Spread (examined fully in another chapter) is what became the “shotgun”. A big part of it was what is now called a Fly Sweep, one of the receivers motioning to the QB, arriving as the ball is snapped, and getting a handoff or fake.

~ research According to many sources, the Philadelphia Eagles QB Tommy Thompson ran  something like the shotgun in the late 1940s. I’m not sure what they called it.

formation_meyer

The Steelers ran the Single Wing thru the 1951 season and many of the pass plays were similar to shotgun. The 1956 NFL Championship Game Bears used a similar alignment for QB George Blanda and QB Ed Brown in passing situations due to Giants pass rush but lost 47-7.

George Halas and the Bears Spread:

According to a 1961 Sports Illustrated article:

The shotgun has been likened to the old Pop Warner double wing that was introduced at Stanford more than 30 years ago, but it has one major variation: there is no blocking back. Actually, it looks more like the short punt formation from a spread that numerous teams have used through the years when they were behind and thinking only of trying a pass for a desperation touchdown. George Halas, the founder of the Chicago Bears, used an approximation of the shotgun a generation ago, but it is Red Hickey’s shuttling quarterbacks who have given the shotgun the added charge it needed to be a success in the sophisticated ranks of the pros.

Don Faurot’s 1950 book Secrets of the Split T Formation mentions the Bears Spread offense. He describes it and says several college teams that were running the Bears T began running this as well. The QB aligned 10 yards deep. The two most popular passes (per Faurot) were to the Center and to the Left End on screens. Faurot proposes defensing it with what he calls a 4-4-2-1, a spread out 6-2 with a coverage close to a modern Cover 3 – below left is the offense and the defense he proposes. The Halas Spread alignment is similar to Tiger Ellison’s short-lived late 1950s Lonesome Polecat formation (illustrated here are the many route combinations, as this formation led to the “Run and Shoot” offense) – note only one player is in a different place from the Halas spread (one of the players on the right would be on the left behind the offensive linemen):

Left: Halas spread; Right: the Lonesome Polecat

xo_form_spread_halas lonesomepolecat

Point being, many coaches over 60 or so years had aligned the primary ball-handler about 7 yards deep. But also, by 1960 the QB was a different position in terms of how it was played. Every once in awhile in football books from the 60s or so about this earlier era it will say “so and so ran the shotgun” so it seems to have been used to refer to a “modern” QB, who would pass or run, and while that player might be the punter (Sammy Baugh, etc), he would not use that same formation to punt. By now the game had evolved from the “when in doubt, punt” era of Heisman and others and teams only punted on 4th down, with the punter (especially when the punter began being someone other than the QB or a good passer or runner) usually lined up far deeper than a QB. At this point, there weren’t many punt fakes, so the focus of that play had changed from one of runs, passes, fakes to just getting off a good punt and covering the return.

And then, the 1960 49ers came along. and their head coach Red Hickey.

“It’s kinda like a shotgun, you just spread out and start firing.” – Red Hickey

Note: In all the sources I can find, Hickey seems to use “shotgun” to refer to the overall spread offensive scheme he was running, so in a way the shotgun for the alignment of the QB began as a misnomer. Regardless, writers and coaches began calling a QB 5-7 yards behind the center the “shotgun” regardless of where anyone else aligned. Hickey installed it and named it and according to many sources “invented” it. It’s primarily Dutch Meyer’s spread formation. Hickey unveiled it December 1960 in a win over the 2 time defending NFL champion Colts, 30-22. (This game is on YouTube)

Some sources say “John Brodie with no running backs” but that’s not really accurate, as the RBs were still on the field; they shifted or aligned to the wing and were used for handoffs and fakes. Brodie was in his 4th year, Waters was a rookie.

It’s the Dutch Meyer spread, the same formation Landry used later as his later shotgun. Here’s an illustration of it from Lombardi’s playbook; he called it “Yellow” (he named his formations after colors).

formation_shotgun

They seemed to shift to it mostly from Red Right. Each split back would go to the wing to his side, and the TE would split out to the right slot. Often Y was on the LOS, not W as above. LHB is H, FB is F, RHB is W. (Olderman, p 341).

There was lots of motion, often using one back in motion, faking to him and running Power O with the other back. Lots of rollout passes, often with pulling Guards for protection.

They used it more in 1961 after Hickey spent the offseason preparing to run it more. Hickey traded away QB Y. A. Tittle and power backs Joe Perry and J. W. Lockett. He converted Abe Woodson from defense to offense to run the ball. The ‘60 version with just Brodie at QB was defeated by the Vikings, so Hickey changed more. Beginning in Week 3, rookie Billy Kilmer (17), Bobby Waters (11), John Brodie (12) all rotated at QB.

~ An October 16, 1961 Sports Illustrated article “Bang Goes the Shotgun” by Alfred Wright describes it: Each of the three 49er quarterbacks is on the San Francisco payroll this year specifically because he can operate out of the shotgun as well as the standard T. Yet each is different from the others. Brodie is a splendid passer and can run a little if he has to. Kilmer is a wonderfully brave and deceptive runner but completely unpredictable and an uncertain passer. Waters is fast enough to be used as a defensive back. He can also throw a good pass and is self-assured enough to have earned the nickname “Cool” Waters. “Red [Hickey] shuffled them in and out so fast that they mixed up our defensive keys,” Detroit Coach George Wilson complained later. “Brodie ran once and passed 12 times. Kilmer passed seven times and ran 16. Waters ran seven and passed once.” (page 36)

In The Pro Style, author Tom Bennett illustrates Kilmer with a back to each side running a shovel pass to the strong side. 

Revolutionary, huh? Well, by the end of October 1961 the offense had been figured out and shut down by Clark Shaughnessy, defensive coordinator of the Bears. Shaughnessy ran all sorts of defensive fronts, ranging from a 3 man line to a 7 man line and rushing between 4 and 7 defenders. He used some A gap blitzes. Soon after this game, some bad snaps followed and the 49ers completely stopped using the shotgun.

Washington used it sporadically in the 1960s. The  Jets used the shotgun for an immobile Joe Namath in 1971 and 1976. 

Hickey began working for the Cowboys in 1966 and spent two decades there. 1975 Cowboys HC Landry and assistant Mike Ditka thought Roger Staubach needed the protection with a young roster and Landry believed if it was a passing situation (3rd downs and 2 min drill), the QB might as well be in the shotgun. Roger Staubach threw the first “Hail Mary” in the 1975 playoffs versus Vikings out of the shotgun. One concern of Landry’s about the shotgun formation was that if you’re gonna put the RBs up close to the line, you might as well send them out on pass routes, in which case you only have 5 potential blockers: 1974 the Cowboys had missed the playoffs for the first time in 9 years and were expected to be worse in ‘75. With the shotgun they went to the SB in ‘75, ‘77, ‘78 (winning in ‘77, losing the other 2 to the Steelers). Landry said it was the old “double wing or triple wing”.

1980 Bills HC Chuck Knox, yes, “Ground Chuck,” used it on 3rd and long.

1981 Bill Walsh didn’t like the shotgun. The first time he tried it, 49ers at Lions, the OL couldn’t hear Montana. The ball was snapped over Montana’s head, “so we had to drop it right away”.

Sidebar: The first game the author remembers seeing the shotgun – in the first complete football game the author watched, as a wee lad of 8 years old – was January 1987, John Elway, The Drive.

1988 According to NFL Films short The Shotgun Formation, 14 teams ran it in “passing situations”. 

1990 Falcons HC Jerry Glanville installed a shorter shotgun with RB directly behind the QB. Glanville ran a variation of the Run and Shoot called the “Red Gun” sometimes run from this shotgun with an offset back to the side the QB would “half roll” to. This tendency was far too easy for defenses, so Glanville put the RB directly behind the QB so the RB could protect to either side. The depth of the QB ws slightly deeper than the later Pistol created by Chris Ault. In 1991 Glanville hired June Jones as OC; Jones put the QB back under center.

1999 Michael Taylor of Mill Valley ran an offense called the “Shotgun I”, which was essentially a Strong Pistol or Weak Pistol but [as opposed to the more common modern use of the offset back as a blocking back] in this offense both backs were ball-carriers.

In 2004, NFL teams used the shotgun less than 15% of the time, now it’s used more than 50% of the time. The turning point was the 2007 Patriots, the first team to use the shotgun more than 50% of the time.

 

 

An Ode To Paul Johnson

Paul Johnson is leaving Georgia Tech, and there’s not enough appreciation for a guy who ran such a unique offense. So here’s one man’s attempt to do, well, something. Johnson replaced Chan Gailey, who’s terrible situational decisions drove this author to the point of madness. Gailey had followed George O’Leary, who had done nothing of note. Both Gailey and O’Leary pretended they could compete for championships, misleading the fans about Georgia Tech’s recruiting abilities. It’s like expecting Stanford to win championships. Never gonna happen. So in came Paul Johnson with the Flexbone. It’s often called the triple option, but that’s just one of the plays.

In the midst of his Georgia Southern playbook from the 1990s, Paul Johnson had the following on a full page:

quote_lamour_pauljohnson

It can’t be easy to run a system that most fans hate to watch (I’d argue most just don’t know how to watch it). If you hate watching the Flexbone, you probably just don’t understand it. But the beauty is there’s just a few core plays.

The main formation is below (this is the labeling for when it’s set to the right). Johnson calls this Spread Right. The A-backs (some say slot backs) are A and H. The B-back (some say Fullback) is B. The WRs are X and Z.

formation_flexbone

If an A back motions around behind the B-back, it’s “Tail” motion, which is used for many plays but especially Rocket Toss. If an A-back motions towards the B-back, then reverses course at the snap, it’s “Twirl” motion.

Way back in the day, allegedly Fisher DeBerry said “We need to be more flexible in the ‘Bone” referring to the need for more passing. HC Ken Hatfield and OC Fisher DeBerry ran the original Flexbone at Air Force. After Hatfield left for Arkansas, DeBerry replaced him. While you could argue that the Flexbone formation is a “double-wingbone”, it’s predated by being the original Run and Shoot formation, and two of the main plays in the flexbone playbook are variations of two of the five standard Run and Shoot “plays” – “Cowboy” and “Texas” with another, the Zone Dive, being the Run and Shoot’s “Mudcat”. Separately, Erk Russell and Paul Johnson were running the Run and Shoot at Georgia Southern. Russell wanted to run the ball more and use the I formation, but Johnson convinced him they could merge the option and other plays into the Run and Shoot. His DC Erk Russell called it the Hambone.

The differences between the DeBerry/Hatfield version and the Johnson version:

  • DeBerry/Hatfield version uses narrower line splits and often a TE to one side.
  • Johnson version uses wider line splits and rarely a TE.

Note: Another version of a triple option was run by Mike Ayers at Wofford, it was from a Wing T with HB moved to slotback position.

Johnson ran his version at Navy and now for 11 seasons at Georgia Tech before retiring to, I assume, read the entire Louis L’Amour ouvre. He pulled off a few upsets and drove opponents crazy, which is all you can expect of Georgia Tech. Now the Flexbone will only be seen at the service academies. Ken Niumatalolo runs a version at Navy (his is similar to Johnson’s); Jeff Monken runs a version at Army (his has lots of unbalanced formations, some Power and Counter, lots of Traps). Troy Calhoun runs a version at Air Force (his has tempo, spread sets, I formation, shotgun, more passing).

Flexbone core plays:

Usually involve the backside A-back motioning pre-snap, but sometimes the playside A-back.

Veer/Triple – option off the A gap, read the 5 tech, B-back into B gap. (Run and Shoot “Cowboy”)

Midline – option off the B gap, read the 3 tech, B-back into A gap

Midline Triple – a combination of Midline and Triple. You read the 5 tech, B-back into A gap.

Counter Option – Fake to B-back one way then pivot and go the other side with the A-back option.

Zone Dive  – called inside run, a handoff to the B-back. (Run and Shoot “Mudcat”)

Rocket Toss – called outside run, a toss to the A-back. (Run and Shoot “Texas”)

Veer Pass – play action; throw the ball (usually deep)

Adjusting the formation or the blocking or the routes gives a huge number of different plays all with simple decisions by the QB. There’s no true C gap play, as there’s no TE. As with any option, the read player is unblocked.

I always thought Johnson should throw more, but that was mostly based on him often saying he wanted to pass more. It seems he just couldn’t get a QB good enough at it. But that’s how it goes. It was fun while it lasted. Supposedly the leading candidate to replace him is Ken Whisenhunt, last seen refusing to adjust the pass protection to protect Marcus Mariota with the Titans, as the Whiz went 3-20. The only silver lining is that Georgia Tech games aren’t shown on the west coast, so it will be easily ignored. Flexbone fans would post lots of Johnson material (including full games and great analysis) on YouTube. No one will care enough to do that now.

The [New] Nadir of Philip F. Rivers

Philip Rivers, in his FIFTEENTH YEAR as an NFL QB, set the bar to a new low Sunday for situational football. First, he celebrated a short pass completion as if it had won the game. It had not, it was just an almost meaningless first down. Then, coming out of the 2 minute warning (essentially a free timeout to discuss SITUATIONAL FOOTBALL), with a 2 point lead, and a 3rd down, and his opponent out of timeouts, Rivers THREW A SCREEN PASS INTO THE DIRT to give his opponent an extra 40 seconds. OF COURSE his opponent used those 40 seconds to beat Rivers’ team as time expired.

Does it matter Von Miller had read and intercepted a screen pass to the right side earlier in the game, and the best Rivers and Lynn could come up with the game on the line was a screen pass to the right side which Von Miller read?! Actually, no it doesn’t because all Rivers had to do was fall down to keep the clock running.

With 1:10 or so, the Broncos would have been desperate, and since their QB is Case Keenum, the Chargers would have had a great chance to win. And that’s if the run play hadn’t converted, which is surely could have as it was 3rd and 7, which is not impossible. The Chargers had gotten a 24 yard completion to Gates moments earlier on the same drive. Plenty of run plays have gotten more than 7 yards, even against defenses expecting run (see Patriots v Jaguars Lead Outside Zone that sealed the AFC title game against a defense which expected that call).

But the Chargers QB was Philip Rivers, and so the Broncos got the ball with plenty of time, moved down the field with short passes (including a check down), and even overcame an offensive pass interference penalty.

Today, all sorts of podcasters are whining about how Blake Bortles is holding back the Jaguars when the truth is Tom Coughlin’s decision to overpay Bortles coupled with Doug Marrone’s moronic playcalling are the things killing the Jaguars. Bortles is terrible but he can throw enough to win against loaded boxes (see the Iso Pop Pass v Steelers in last year’s playoffs and his passes in the win versus the Patriots earlier this year) when the play design helps him. But Marrone shows a lack of faith in big moments (last year’s AFC title game, yesterday) and runs uncreative run plays which barely have a chance. These podcasters (Kevin Clark the worst I’ve heard so far) pretend that passing is smarter than smartly running out the clock. Even when we have examples like Philip Rivers, these podcasters say “hey! rules favor offense, rules favor passing, you should never run!” while a smart coach understands it’s never just “run or pass”. There’s play action, bootlegs, RPOs, screens run to the side Von Miller isn’t aligned to, etc. It’s about the decision, the play call, the play design, the execution. It’s never just running or throwing (Rivers mistake was, seeing the screen play blown up, not knowing in the moment to take a sack), but a 100% chance to keep the clock running is often a better decision than a 75% (or whatever percentage you want to attach to “safe” passes) chance to keep the clock running.

In his podcast, Clark repeatedly says “what are we doing?!” rhetorically, as if he’s doing anything other than misleading the listener on situational football. I’ve watched a lot of football, and I’ve seen ONE TEAM successfully run the clock out passing, and it was the Patriots, who have definitely the best coach and probably the best QB of all time and STILL USUALLY RUN THE CLOCK OUT BY RUNNING THE BALL, but understand situational football is almost always unique and should be treated as such.

Doug Marrone failing while running instead of passing doesn’t mean you should pass, and Philip Rivers failing while passing instead of running doesn’t mean passing is always stupid. It’s always about the context of the situation. But with the worst situational coach of all time, Andy Reid, getting unanimous praise for his offense, it will probably just get worse. We’ll look back fondly on the days of Reid blowing a Super Bowl by not understanding there was a clock in the game by saying, “At least it wasn’t as bad as Dan Quinn and Kyle Shanahan blowing a 25 point lead to the same fucking team.” Because that’s the world we’re living in, where garbage coaching is rewarded with millions of dollars and the people podcasting about it lie about what really wins and loses games.

 

Note: Sometimes it never comes down to situational football, and for an example of that, see the Saints v Eagles game from yesterday, which was just a whooping. It wasn’t because Payton called lots of pass plays or called lots of run plays, he did both with ease. It was just a whooping, because one team spent all offseason talking bout how much fun they have, and how they’d rather win one title while having fun than win five titles by, I don’t know, working real hard? Games like that are harder to learn from, but they’re a brief respite in this world of shit because they can’t be misunderstood. One team is good, the other team is bad, and the scoreboard proves it.

 

Military Terminology in Football

“Pro football is like nuclear warfare. There are no winners, only survivors.”

– Frank Gifford

Insert groan here. Not only are a few of the same terms used in war and football, but people are obsessed with this. The biggest problem is uppity people like the late Lewis Mumford, who hated sports and wrote crap like this:

“Team sports rank only above war among the least effective reactions against the machine.”

Oh, the machine, and how it crushes us all.

And then John Limon in Writing After War: American War Fiction From Realism to Postmodernism (a book with some good things in it, just not the football stuff) cites Mumford and writes crap like this:

“Football – with its long bombs, blitzes, trenches, etc. – is a verbal compendium of twentieth- century war, so that the football novel ought to be the non-combatant’s Vietnam novel . . . The neat symmetry of the sports metaphor in terms of literary effects is simple to complete. If the baseball novel is meta-literary, the basketball novel anxiously literary, then the football novel is anti-literary.”

That is nonsense. Anti-literary? There’s maybe one good football novel per decade on average, and there’s far too few to find much meaning in which to extrapolate what it IS. Whether Limon has bad taste in writers or football is unclear, but he refers to Norman Mailer’s Why Are We In Vietnam as “the apotheosis of the football novel”. It’s one of the worst football books this writer’s found (out of the current 401 this writer has read), with no real insight into the game. I won’t get into Mailer stabbing his wife, cause it’s hump day and I’m in a good mood. 

According to Limon,

Football and war . . . are simultaneously the arenas in which

    1) obsolete language is revived and

    2) contemporary language is invented.

It’s a stretch. If you come up with a play, you’ve got to call it something. Only a few of the words in football have any military history. Go ahead, look through a playbook, there’s many online. You won’t find many military terms. You’ll find all sorts of weird terms, but most include a letter to give the players a hint of what it means, L or R for left and right, S and W for strong and weak, etc. Many are tagged with blocking calls or rush stunts or coverage wrinkles. Sure, there are blitzes, but there are also dogs, cats, snakes, and all sorts of other terms. An almost endless assortment, as many playbooks are hundreds of pages long.

Note: There’s an essay by Walker Percy, “Naming and Being,” about naming things that’s highly recommended but has no bearing on football. But Walker Percy’s great!

Possibly the greatest living American novelist wrote this:

“I reject the notion of football as warfare. Warfare is warfare. We don’t need a substitute because we’ve got the real thing.

– Zapalac (character) in End Zone by Don DeLillo

Now that’s writing!

Perhaps a man named David Boss put it best:

“Professional football is a game, not a war. It is for a Sunday afternoon, not forever. It is for win or lose, not life or death . .  . but for a few hours each Sunday it is the ultimate and only conflict, resolved by the same classic determinants: speed, strength, skill, strategy, tactics, courage, aplomb.”

– David Boss, The Pro Football Experience

There’s another book worth reading! It seems almost unknown, but it’s great. I got mine on Amazon for $0.01 plus shipping. You wanna hate Amazon, but then they sell you a great book for ONE CENT. Them’s the breaks.

This writer believes there are only three classic football novels, and they’re vastly different and highly recommended for people who read AND like football:

End Zone by Don DeLillo

North Dallas Forty by Peter Gent

If I Don’t Six by Elwood Reid

I wish I had some lame military/football jargon to wrap this article up with. Alas, I don’t.